Note to Schmoozers: This is a draft of a paper that Des King and I are doing for a French
journal’s special issue on the Shelby County decision. It is written for a European
audience so includes material superfluous for this audience. But haven’t had time to
produce an appropriately abridged version for you – sorry! Hope it’s not too much
trouble to skip over all that is very, very familiar.
Rogers Smith

The Last Stand:
Restricting Voting Rights and Sustaining White Power in Modern America
Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith

Abstract: The Supreme Court’s Shelby County v. Holder ruling invalidating Section 4(b)
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 should be understood as in part a product of efforts to
resist further transformations in traditional American institutional arrangements that
have conferred advantages on whites, especially disproportionate political power.
Those efforts are not likely to succeed in the long run, but they may embroil American
elections and American governance in paralyzing conflicts for years to come.

1. Voting Rights and America’s racial policy alliances.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in Shelby County v. Holder finding Section 4(b) of
the Voting Rights Act (VRA)1 unconstitutional is the most transformative of the
important opinions issued in the final week of the Court’s 2012-13 term.2 The decision
attacks the core of the VRA. It threatens to end the most interventionist egalitarian
power given to the federal government in the twentieth century: the requirement of
federal pre-clearance of changes in voting rules in certain jurisdictions. Under the VRA’s
Section 5, a number of states identified by the formula in 4(b) as having operated voting
systems with inappropriate barriers to full and equal participation are required to
obtain permission from the U.S. Department of Justice or a federal court before making
any changes to state or local laws which impact voting. The obliteration of Section 4(b)
Voting Rights Act of 1965 Public Law 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. As Amended Through PL
110-258, Enacted July 1, 2008.
2 Shelby County v. Holder, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/1296_6k47.pdf
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powers marks a critical battle site in the struggle between those favoring and those
opposing amelioration of material racial inequality in the US, furthering since it signals
the ascendancy t of the latter.
The Court ruled that the formula used in Section 4(b) to determine if states or local
governments violate the VRA—whether less than 50% of persons of voting age were
registered to vote in 1964, or whether less than 50% actually voted in the 1964
presidential election--is no longer valid. There are, indeed, reasons to fault Congress for
not updating the formula in the last half century.3 But simply finding Section 4(b)
unconstitutional renders the VRA’s Section 5 preclearance powers toothless. The
majority justices must have known that pressing Congress to amend the law would
probably cripple the VRA. Although at this writing, Wisconsin Republican Jim
Sensenbrenner in the House and Vermont Democrat Patrick Leahy in the Senate are
promoting a bill that would restore preclearance requirements for states and cities that
have histories of voting rights violations in the last 15 years, it is improbable that the
House, heavily influenced by a conservative Republican faction, will even vote on it.4
The end of pre-clearance approval for changes to voting rules or procedures in the
currently covered states means that any arguably discriminatory changes, including
new voter ID laws, restrictions on early voting times, or redistricting, can only be legally
challenged retrospectively, after an election has occurred under these new procedures.
This shift to after-the-fact litigation is a sharp reversal in the legal resources available to
minority voters prior to an election, a weakening of anti-discrimination law, and
succour to recently revivified voter suppression activists (Piven, Minnite and Groarke
2009, 164-203).5
These realities are widely recognized. Less obviously but just as importantly, this
abolition of pre-clearance approval should be seen as, among other things, a triumph
for what we call the “color blind racial policy alliance” in American politics (King and
Smith 2011, 9-10). The ruling also affirms that the U.S. Supreme Court is the most
aggressive government institution in this alliance today.
We have argued that American racial politics has historically been structured by
opposed policy alliances (or “racial orders”) that include movement activists, political
parties, and governing institutions, held together by views on how to resolve the central
racial policy issue of their eras—first slavery, then de jure segregation, and in the
For a view that Congress ignored hard questions about the VRA’s retained criteria for
determining preclearance view, see Pildes (2006). He advocates a national uniform
standard policy rather than the pre-existing covered jurisdictions framework.
4 The Editorial Board, “A Step Toward Restoring Voting Rights,” New York Times,
January 18, 2014, SR10.
5 Piven, Minnete and Groarke provide a comprehensive typology of the current methods
of vote suppression, or what they call “keeping the voters down,” including
misinformation campaigns, “caging” and challenging voters, and manipulation of
registration records and lists (2009, 167-186).
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modern day, whether racial equality is best realized by insisting that public policies
eschew racial categories, the view of the color blind policy alliance, or by consciously
constructing measures to reduce material racial inequalities, the view of the rival “race
conscious” policy alliance. The bulk of the American public favors color blind policies,
but most Americans also oppose any measures that appear to retreat from the
accomplishments of the 1960s civil rights era (King and Smith 2011, 285-286). As a
result, elected officials of both parties often prefer to leave controversial racial
questions to less visible administrative agencies or the politically insulated courts than
to engage with them in election campaigns.6 And the fact that the nation has had a
preponderance of Republican Presidents since 1968 means that the Supreme Court has
had in the post-1960s decades a majority that has increasingly moved toward rigid
insistence on color blind views of constitutional equality (King and Smith 2011, 130131, 291-292).
As the efforts of some moderate Republicans to show themselves champions of minority
voting rights indicates, although many conservative political leaders have objected to
the Voting Rights Act throughout its history, its popularity means that probably only the
Supreme Court could have openly sought to limit its reach. Enacted by Congress
initially to be a temporary measure, the VRA soon proved the most successful act of the
civil rights era, in both policy and political terms. It has enfranchised millions of largely
non-white voters and promoted non-white office holding, vindicating America’s claims
to be a democracy in the eyes of all Americans. As a result, Congress has repeatedly
renewed the VRA with overwhelming bipartisan approval in final roll call votes—
though conservatives consistently sought to weaken the law at earlier stages in
legislative renewal processes (King and Smith 2011, 170-179).
Color blind advocates have been the most outspoken critics of the modern VRA,
contending it has been turned into a vehicle for race conscious policymaking, which
they view as immoral and unconstitutional. They and conservatives more broadly have
also correctly seen the law as aiding the voting power of supporters of liberal policies
across a range of issues. The VRA’s 1975 amendments extended its protections to
many Latinos by adding language-based triggers for federal monitoring and preclearance requirements, and in 1982, further amendments authorized the creation of
minority majority districts as solutions to proven patterns of discrimination, overriding
contrary judicial rulings (King and Smith 2011, 174-176). In partisan terms, the nonAnFor a valuable illustration of this electoral silence is see the discussion of the nondiscussion of segregation in the last Chicago mayoral election campaign: Steve Bogira
“Separate, Unequal and Ignored: Racial segregation remains Chicago’s most
fundamental problem. Why isn’t it an issue in the mayor’s race?” Chicago Reader
February 10, 2011; accessed at: http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/chicagopolitics-segregation-african-american-black-white-hispanic-latino-population-censuscommunity/Content?oid=3221712

Page

3

6

white voters the VRA helped secure the right to register and to vote have
overwhelmingly favored Democrats in the 21st century. In 2013, for example, while
Romney carried the 72% of the electorate that identified as white by 59%-39%, Obama
carried the 13% of the electorate who identified as African American 93% to 6%; the
10% of the electorate who classified as Latinos, 71% to 27%; and the 3% of the
electorate who were Asian American, 73% to 26% (CNN 2012). And in regard to
policies, non-white voters remain far more favorable to race conscious measures and
many other liberal positions than most whites (King and Smith 2011, 98, 127, 257;
Ethnic Majority 2012). Consequently, Republicans, particularly the great bulk of
Republicans who now identify as conservatives, have had strong reasons to discourage
instead of encourage voting by these groups, thereby maintaining a disproportionate
predominance of whites in America’s active electorate.
For years, Republican legislators have aggressively sought to enact new barriers to
likely Democratic and non-white voters, and those efforts accelerated in the wake of the
Shelby v. Holder decision. Since the Court ruling, of states covered by the 4(b) formula,
eight have moved to adopt new voter ID laws or other voter validation checks or to
implement their recent voter ID laws, including Texas which previously had its law
rejected by the Justice Department when it sought pre-clearance. Six states not covered
by 4(b) have adopted similar measures.7 These efforts have prompted VRA Section 2
lawsuits, used to challenge voting qualifications, practices and procedures that deny or
abridge voting rights on account of race or color, against the state governments. The
Justice Department is suing North Carolina to challenge four provisions in the state’s
new voting law, including one which requires photo identification, and to seek a
reinstatement of pre-clearance obligation on the state; and it is challenging Texas’s
photo ID requirements and its redistricting plans.8
President Obama described the Court’s decision as “deeply disappointing,” and groups
representing minority voters such as the NAACP and the NAACP LDF condemned the
decision as unjustified because of continuing problems of voter discrimination – a
realityproblem the majority justices acknowledged. But supporters of the Court’s
decision - conservative legislators, proponents of states’ rights, champions of tighter
voter restrictions, and critics of the efficacy and justice of public policy interventions
that seek to promote material equality – argue that the empirical evidence about recent
voting turnout for minority compared with white voters means the need for VRA
preclearance in the jurisdictions covered in 1964 has evaporated. Few contemporary
American political battles are seen as having higher stakes.
(a) The racial alliances framework.

“Everything That’s Happened Since Supreme Court Ruled on Voting Rights Act,”
http://www.propublica.org/article/voting-rights-by-state-map.
8 Ibid. and “Justice Dept Poised to File Lawsuit Over Voter ID Law,” New York Times 30
September 2013.
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In large part because European-descended Americans acquired land in North America
through extensive forcible displacement of indigenous tribes, and their newly
independent United States then built its economy through substantial reliance on the
plantation labor of African slaves, from early on in their history Americans elaborated
ideologies and laws privileging those labelled “whites” over most non-whites and
particularly those labelled “black” (though just where these racial lines were drawn was
always contested and often shifted). The elaboration of “white supremacy” defences of
Native American removal, the Mexican American War, and above all chattel slavery
created deep material and psychological investments in racially inegalitarian
institutions and practices for many whites, but many Americans of all races also always
condemned slavery as morally wrong, economically inefficient, and politically
corrupting. Yet even after the nation ended slavery at the fearsome price of a massive
civil war, commitments to white supremacy remained so powerful that their
proponents eventually succeeded in defeating racially egalitarian Reconstruction
programs and creating a new white supremacist racial order, the Jim Crow segregation
system, that prevailed in American life and U.S. politics from the 1880s to the 1960s.9
It is vital to bear this familiar history in mind to understand current controversies--for
the reality is that the political, economic, and social systems advantaging whites built up
during that long history have persisted in many forms despite Americans’ formal
repudiation of legalized white supremacy.
The Voting Rights Act, along with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, constituted the core of that
formal repudiation, but they only began processes of building institutions and practices
that would be genuinely racially inclusive and egalitarian in fact. Controversies over
how far and in what ways to pursue those goals in many arenas still divide Americans
today and no disputes are more crucial than voting rights. Though most white
Americans no longer believe their nation should be one that explicitly gives special de
jure privileges to whites, many appearare made anxious by the prospect that whites
might soon no longer have anything approaching the disproportionate political power
and economic status they have enjoyed throughout U.S. history (King and Smith 2011,
168-191, 253-284).
Indeed, white Americans accepted repudiation of their de jure privileges in the 1960s
only under extraordinary circumstances, including the heightening of many decades of
protesting, marching, organizing and litigating by what became known as the civil rights
movement; the pressures of the Cold War; the shocking assassination of President John
F. Kennedy in Texas soon after he proposed what became the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and
the consequent rise to the heights of power of a man determined to be a towering figure
For a classic overview of these developments, see John Hope Franklin and Evelyn
Brooks Higginbotham, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans, 9th ed.
(New York: McGraw Hill, 2010). For an analysis of the factors driving racial change, see
Philip A. Klinkner with Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of
Racial Equality in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
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in the history of American democracy (Morris 1984; Packard 2002). The Voting Rights
Act was enacted by Congress in 1965 after an exceptional exercise of presidential
persuasion by that man, President Lyndon B. Johnson, a reformed segregationist
southern Democrat who had won a landslide election after Kennedy’s death and then
the passage of the Civil Rights Act in the previous year. Together the VRA and the CRA
extended equal rights of citizenship to African Americans and other discriminated
against minorities, restoring the unfulfilled promise of the post-Civil War amendments
and civil rights statutes. As we show in our book Still A House Divided, these momentous
legislative changes spurred further battles in racial policy and politics from the 1960s.
At first these struggles prompted discussions of a range of policy instruments about
how best to address racial inequality (Ackerman 2014), but within the space of a decade
this range had collapsed and coalesced into two mutually exclusive approaches.
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First is the color blind policy alliance whose members vigorously oppose government
action to reduce the many persisting racial inequalities that advantage whites,
especially if those actions come in the form of direct, race-targeted measures—though
many color blind advocates condemn all race conscious policy making as equally
immoral, whether or not explicit racial classifications are used. They have mobilized
against affirmative action and integration initiatives in education and employment
(including seeking to truncate the impact of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and pursuing Supreme Court cases which in piecemeal fashion have
banned or discouraged minority set-aside and federal contract compliance programs,
and school district powers to foster racially integrated schools); they have opposed
efforts to promote integrated affordable housing and environmental justices efforts
focused on minority communities; and they campaigned first to prevent the VRA being
made permanent and, once made permanent, then to water down the voting law’s
efficacy. This color blind racial policy alliance has gained great acceptance amongst
white voters, as measured by voting and in public opinion attitudes, and it continues to
shape white voter opinion on a wide range of issues. One scholar shows, for example,
how this racial policy outlook amongst white voters strongly influenced attitudes
toward the Affordable Health Care Act (Tesler 2012, 2013). The influence of color-blind
stances converges more generally with a rightward shift amongst many, though not all
voters that has heightened America’s sharp polarization. Partly as a result, one political
scientist finds that overall the U.S. voting population in 2012 expressed conservative
attitudes to an extent not recorded since 1952 (Stimson 2013). There is little doubt that
many, probably most, of these American voters, conservative activists, and color blind
proponents do not consciously favor white supremacy. But there is also little doubt that
most think it unwise and unjust for public policies to seek aggressively to transform
further the political, economic, and social institutions and practices built up under
centuries of white supremacist policies--institutions and practices in which whites
continue to hold advantaged places, in practice if not in law.

address racial inequalities, including voting discrimination. The race conscious policy
alliance programs – such as affirmative action (focused both on legacies of the Jim Crow
era and more recent barriers to equality), anti-discrimination in housing, multicultural
education initiatives, expanded EEOC regulatory powers in labor markets to counter
discrimination, criminal justice reforms aimed at ending the disproportionate
incarceration of non-whites, and more – have all been under multiple political
challenges since the 1970s, with declining congressional and judicial support even after
the election of America’s first African American president. But for many decades most
opponents of race-conscious policies chose to identify with, rather than to oppose
openly, the now widely admired major civil rights laws of the 1960s. Consequently, it
has generally proven possible for race conscious proponents to sustain and sometimes
to extend those original measures over muted color blind opposition.
One success came in 2006, when the VRA was renewed after Congress spent 10 months
reviewing the act, holding 21 hearings attended by over 90 witnesses and examining
over 15,000 pages of evidence in addition to looking at the voting patterns in and
outside the 16 Section 5 covered jurisdictions. These deliberations welcomed post 1965
advances but concluded that entrenched voting discrimination in the areas singled out
by the 4(b) formula endured.10
In economic arenas, race conscious alliance supporters point to the documented erosion
of effective regulatory agency efforts to root out labor market discrimination to argue
that efforts to aid racial minorities continue to be needed (de Burca 2012).
Advocates of race conscious reform policiesThey insist that whether or not the
proponents of color blind measures explicitly desire to maintain white privileges,
adoption of their stance inevitably means failure to pursue race conscious reform
policies aggressively means that many longstanding forms of white advantage will
persist for at least the near to middle term future. One of those advantages is the
disproportionate electoral political power of whites, the specific racial inequality that
the Voting Rights Act sought to end.
(b) The Shelby decision.
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In the eyes of the majority of the Supreme Court, the VRA has succeeded so well that its
most significant original provisions have become obsolete. Shelby County v. Holder
fundamentally undercuts the federal government’s powers to intervene in state and
local cases of voting discrimination. To be sure, the decision leaves intact the VRA’s
Section 3 powers. These powers enable the Justice Department to bring states, cities,
and other political subdivisions under its 15th Amendment voting rights jurisdiction.
But to do so, the federal government must demonstrate that state legislators or the
public officeholders responsible for compiling and monitoring electoral rolls’ accuracy

or other aspects of electoral systems have intentionally engaged in racial
discrimination. This criterion of discriminatory intent is notoriously slippery, and one
major reason why the VRA’s Section 4(b) formula was enacted in the first place. It
enabled the Justice Department to act if a political subdivision was simply failing to
register or turn out half its voters.
The choice between including the need to demonstrate intentional racial discrimination
versus showing a pattern of disparate impact on parts of the citizenry is a general one in
all civil rights enforcement strategies. Opting for the former always means opting for
the weaker measure.
The majority of the Shelby justices concluded that the low registration rates and voting
tests that plagued southern states in the 1960s have gone, and that the gap between
white and black registration and voting rates in the covered areas is no longer
significant (and in some cases even favors blacks). They cited white-black voting gaps
of, for example, 49.9 per cent in Alabama and 63.2 in Mississippi in 1965, compared
with 2004 gaps of 0.9 per cent in Alabama and -3.8 per cent in Mississippi (p15).
Impressive and important as that progress in increasing black voter turnout is, both the
oral hearing for Shelby and the judgment demonstrate how the five majority justices
construed their decision about VRA in Shelby as a means to advance the color blind
agenda of ending race conscious assistance measures. After listening to the Justice
Department defence of the VRA, Justice Antonio Scalia suggested that members of the
US Senate who supported the Section 5 preclearance provisions did so for political
reasons only, contending that such elected officials feared being criticized for opposing
it. Note that the 4(b) formula was clearly race conscious, concerned with obstacles to
minority voters, but it was not explicitly race targeted. It focused only on percentage of
registered and actual voters, not the race of voters per se. Nonetheless Scalia still
excoriated congressional renewal of the VRA as being part of a “phenomenon that is
called perpetuation of racial entitlement.”11
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Scalia’s characterization expresses one of the two beliefs underlying the Court’s
majority opinion: the notion that because preclearance no longer seems required to
protect voters against discrimination, it operates instead as an unjust legal privilege for
non-white southern voters and so amounts to racism in a new form. The other element
is the belief that the old form, white racism, is no longer sufficiently entrenched in the
covered jurisdictions to warrant an interventionist preclearance power, even though
the justices conceded that some discrimination continues (“voting discrimination still
exists.”12 p2). Outside the Court’s deliberations, color blind proponent and Republican
Senator Rand Paul went further, contending that in fact no “objective evidence” of

voting discrimination against African Americans exists today in the covered states,
much less in America as a whole.13
Although we believe enough has changed to make a strong case that Section 4(b)’s
formula needs to be updated, it is at best naïve to think that high voting rates by
themselves equate with an absence of discrimination. Since the passage of the VRA,
many of the covered jurisdictions (and others) have exhibited repeated efforts to
establish new districting or at-large voting systems that would reduce chances for
minority voters to elect a proportionate number of officeholders, even when they turn
out in significant numbers. These efforts often appear The Justice Department has
often scrutinized and rejected such changes in voting systems in these areas, deciding
they were in fact aimed at just such vote dilution. IAnd in Texas, for example, a three
judge federal court found in 2012 that the Republican-controlled legislature’s proposed
redistricting plan would discriminate against African American and other minority
voters. The judges also concluded that the plan’s designers intended this outcome. They
observed that the lawyers challenging the districting scheme had provided more
“evidence of discriminatory intent than we have space, or need, to address here.”14
Again, it is far more effective to protect minority voting rights through preclearance
rejection of such schemes than it is to sue after the elections in which they have been
employed. Contrary to Senator Paul and the Court’s majority, the need for such
preclearance remains substantial, because there is abundant evidence of continuing
discriminatory initiatives of these sorts. Between 2006 when the VRA was last
reauthorized and 2012, 31 proposed changes to elections fell foul of the Justice
Department’s approval, and in the period 1999 to 2005, 153 proposed changes were
dropped after questions were raised about them by the Department of Justice.15 Shelby
County itself had pursued redistricting plans that the Justice Department assessed as
limiting the influence of black voters, precipitating the County’s legal attack on VRA
preclearance requirements.
This record animated Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s stern dissent into Shelby County and
her assessment that “the scourge of discrimination has not yet extirpated.” Ginsburg
reported: “all told, between 1982 and 2006, DOJ objections blocked over 700 voting

See news report of his August 2013 speech: http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/08/15/randpaul-no-objective-evidence-of-racial-discrimination-in-elections/; Aaron Blake “Rand
Paul: No ‘objective evidence’ African Americans are prevented from voting,” Washington
Post August 14, 2013.
14 US District Court for the District of Columbia, State of Texas v. USA & Eric Holder, Civil
Action No 11-1303.
15 Myrna Perez and Vishal Agraharkar, If Section 5 Fails: New Voting Implications.
Brennan Center for Justice, NYU Law School, p2.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/147170166/If-Section-5-Falls-New-Voting-Implications,
2.
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changes based on a determination that the changes were discriminatory.”16 In a highly
detailed opiniondissent, Ginsburg cited Congress’s 2006 decision to reauthorize
because of the VRA’s continuing efficacy as an instrument against discrimination against
non-white voters in many parts of the country, including the covered regions, and she
contended:
“But the Court today terminates the remedy that proved to be best suited to block that
discrimination. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 has worked to combat voting
discrimination where other remedies had been tried and failed. Particularly effective is
the VRA’s requirement of federal preclearance for all changes to voting laws in the
regions of the country with the most aggravated records of rank discrimination against
minority voting rights.”17
The dissenting opinion ended with a pointed metaphor, as Ginsburg concluded that
“throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop
discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you
are not getting wet.”18
In sum, the majority Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder, striking down an effective
and prestigious law, affirms that the politically insulated and largely Republicanappointed Supreme Court is now the most aggressive member of the modern racial
political alliance favoring color blindness. The opinion sits with and complements the
Court’s steadfast erosion of affirmative action, set asides, school integration programs,
and federal contract compliance measures since the early 1980s.
2. The color blind policy alliance’s upward march.
Shelby County v. Holder was not, however, simply just anotherone more important
victorydecision delivered by the Court to the modern color blind policy alliance. It was
a major advance on what is perhaps the central battleground upon which the two
modern racial policy alliances have been battling for nearly three decades: the
structuring of access to electoral power (Piven, Minnete and Graoake 2009: 1-6).
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Of course, the pertinent history could be extended much further back. It is a
commonplace in political struggles for political forces to seek to disfranchise or dilute
the voting power of their opponents. Disfranchisement through a great variety of
mechanisms was a cornerstone of the subjugation of black Americans during the Jim
Crow era (Tuck 2009; Valelly 2005). And as the two parties have become identified
with the rival modern racial policy alliances (a reality manifested in the party line
division between the 5 Republican-nominated majority versus the 4 Democraticnominated dissenting justices in Shelby), the modern GOP began to pursue a variety of

means of minimizing voting by likely Democrats, often poorer non-white voters., with a
variety of means.
That pattern began when, twelve years into the “Reagan Revolution,” the Democrats
briefly gained control of both houses of Congress as well as the White House after the
1992 elections. They quickly passed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993,
designed to achieve near-universal registration of eligible voters, in part by allowing
persons to register as they applied for driver licenses or various social services (hence
its nickname, the “Motor Voter” law). Republicans attacked the bill as an
unconstitutional infringement on state powers to define voter qualifications and as
likely to unleash voter fraud (Minnite 2010, 136). Once the bill, which did not go into
effect until 1995, began to add millions of disproportionately less affluent and
disproportionately minority voters to the rolls, Republicans and conservative advocacy
groups and pundits began to stress more and more vociferously that voter fraud was a
serious national problem; but no evidence of fraud was ever found convincing by the
courts that considered challenges to the law (Minnite 2010, 136-139).
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Then in 2000, the Bush-Gore election debacle dramatized the many other inadequacies
of America’s decentralized, partisan-operated system of conducting elections. In
response, Congress passed the 2002 “Help America Vote Act” (HAVA), in part to address
the voting problems exposed in 2000 in Florida—but Republicans also included in the
act a requirement that states collect official identifying information from citizens when
they registered to vote, measures already in place in Florida (Minnite 2010, 134-135).
From that point on, GOP state legislators began pushing for more and more demanding
Voter ID requirements, all in the name of combating vote fraud. They gave new
emphasis, bolstered in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, to the danger of voting by
illegal immigrants who supposedly could register when applying for a driver’s licenses,
despite their lack of citizenship. These arguments were still advanced without any
concrete evidence that any such fraud was occurring (Minnite 2010, 8-14). But
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In the same years Republicans, who had by and large championed immigrant workers
and courted Latino voters in the Reagan years, found a new issue in public anxieties
stirred by the rising number of unauthorized, primarily Mexican and Central American
immigrants in the wake of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and the
1990 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Zolberg 2006, 403-423; King
and Smith 2011, 241-245). At both the state and national levels, Republicans enacted
measures restricting the rights of documented and undocumented immigrants during
the 1990s. But ironically, these measures accelerated naturalization rates for legal
Latino immigrants. They also and heightened their already strong tendencies of new
Latino citizens to vote Democratic (Zolberg 2006, 409, 424). Consequently, Republicans
became still more concerned that the fast-growing non-white segment of the American
electorate posed a rising threat to their electoral prospects, especially in immigrantreceiving states, which new, more diffuse immigration patterns were making far more
numerous.

thesesuch claims formed a piece with mounting Republican-led state and local efforts
throughout the first decade of the 21st century to enact a range of restrictive laws that
might persuade immigrants to return home, instead of seeking citizenship—an
approach immigration opponents referred to as “attrition through enforcement,” aimed
at encouraging “self-deportation” (Smith 2013).
These joint GOP efforts to make voting more difficult and to deter immigrants from
becoming citizens expressed partisan concerns to hold on to power; but they were more
than that. They represented a choice to identify the Republican Party with the concerns
of those white Americans who for whatever reasons felt threatened by the rising
numbers and political power of non-white voters. This choice was not inevitable.
President George W. Bush, like Ronald Reagan before him, favored comprehensive
immigration reform in part because he believed Republicans could and should compete
successfully for Latino votes. But Bush failed to persuade the increasingly powerful
right wing of his party of the value of such a strategy. Instead, Republican efforts
perceived as hostile to non-whites, including restrictive voting laws and anti-immigrant
initiatives, continued to mount through the 2000s, and they expanded further after the
election of Barack Obama. Keith Bentele and Erin O’Brien have recently documented
the rising trend of bills proposed in virtually every state to pose new barriers to voting
after 2006, as well as the rising number that were enacted from 2010 on (Bentele and
O’Brien 2013, 1088-1090). They contend that “the Republican party has engaged in
strategic demobilization efforts in response to changing demographics, shifting
electoral fortunes, and an internal rightward ideological drift” that has been “heavily
shaped by racial considerations” (1089). Specifically, they find such legislative
initiatives occurring and succeeding more often “where African-Americans and poor
people vote more frequently, and there are larger numbers of non-citizens” (1098, 1102,
italics in original). Again, though these efforts were stalled by various state judicial
decisions up through 2012, they instantly accelerated after the Supreme Court’s Shelby
County decision (Brennan Center http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election2013-voting-laws-roundup).19 Recent political science research also indicates that not
only are Democrats right to think that restrictive voter laws take “aim along racial lines
with strategic partisan intent,” they have racial consequences (Bentele and O’Brien
2013, 1104). Rachael Cobb and her colleagues find that when voter ID laws are
implemented, African American and Latino voters are asked for IDs at significantly
higher rate than white voters (Cobb, Greiner, and Quinn 2012, 2).20
Myrna Perez and Vishal Agraharkar If Section 5 Fails: New Voting Implications.
Brennan Center for Justice, NYU Law School, p2. .
http://www.scribd.com/doc/147170166/If-Section-5-Falls-New-Voting-Implications
20 The aim of the Cobb et al study is to determine whether in fact voter ID laws can be
administered in race neutral ways. Methodologically they strove to design their study
and to test the data in ways that avoided biases – dealing with such problems as nonresponse and the likelihood of clustering by voting location of ID requests. A sensitivity
analysis was designed to take account of which voters under federal or state law are
19
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GOP support for restricting voting laws was not inevitable. Many expected that the
Republicans would change course after Obama was re-elected in 2012 with a larger
share of the Latino and Asian-American votes than in 2008 (and only a slightly smaller
share of the African American vote). At first, many GOP leaders seemed to agree. The
Republican National Committee’s post-election “Growth and Opportunity” internal
review commission argued that in light of the nation’s “demographic changes”, unless
the Republicans begin to strengthen their appeal to Latinos, in part by revising their
positions on immigration, “we will lose future elections.”21 This proposition fits with
the arguments of scholars such as Hochschild, Weaver and Burch, who anticipate
transformations point to the likely emergence of a ‘new racial order’ in American
politics to accommodatereflecting the growing diversity of its population across race,
ethnicity and income, driven by long term immigration trends and the liberalizing
effects of civil rights reforms. Certainly in respect to immigrants the historical pattern of
initial hostility has been replaced with acceptance as the new members earned their
‘whiteness’ (Roediger 2005). Even if no longer relying upon such ideologies the modern
scenario of immigrants as sources of tranformation makes hypothetical sense.
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legally required to provide an ID. The study used the jurisdiction of the City of Boston in
the 2008 election, when they expected that “voter ID laws were unlikely to pose issues
of racial difference” (3). Their findings are alarming. Despite their acknowledgment of
methodological impediments to eliminating all sources of bias in their study, the
authors report “strong evidence that Hispanic and black voters were asked for IDs at
higher rates than similarly situated white voters” (3). Nor do they see any easy remedy
to the input of discretion employed by poll workers: “to the extent that one
hypothesizes, as we do, that our results may be due to unconscious assumptions on the
part of poll workers paid less than minimum wage to work 15-hour days” their evidence
suggests “such assumption may resist remediation via simple training programs” (3).
This last point suggests that merely training poll workers in neutral and impartial law
administration will not overcome the prejudices the researchers found in practice.
21 Cited in Ronald Brownstein, “Republicans Can’t Win With White Voters Alone,” The
Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/print/2013/098/repulbicans-cant-winwith-white-voters-alone.
22 Ibid.; Thomas B. Edsall, “Can Republicans Paint the White House Red?”, New York
Times Opinionator, August 28, 2013.
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But soon, as journalists including Ronald Brownstein and Thomas Edsall have reported,
over the spring and summer of 2013, for many other Republicans, “the sense of
demographic urgency…palpably dissipated.”22 A number of conservative analysts,
especially Sean Trende, a writer for RealClearPolitics who has sometimes been
employed as a GOP strategist, contended that it is a viable strategy for Republicans to
win in 2014 and 2016, and perhaps beyond, by increasing turnout and winning still
larger margins of support from white voters, especially “downscale, Northern, rural
whites.” Trende has contended that GOP support among whites can realistically reach
as high as 70%, which with high turnout would be enough to produce victories despite
Democrats winning over 70% of Latino and Asian voters and well over 90% of black

voters. He doubts that high African American, Latino, and Asian American voter turnout
will continue when Barack Obama is not on the ballot.23
Other analysts have vigorously debated the realism of Trende’s estimates, but his
arguments have effectively been reinforced by other Republican strategists and many
political scientists who contend that for a number of reasons, Republicans have good
chances to win in the next two elections, perhaps recapturing full control of Congress
and the Presidency. Some Republicans believe that their efforts to restrict voting,
especially voting by poorer and non-white Americans, through Voter ID laws and
related initiatives that have exploded since the Supreme Court struck down Section 4 of
the Voting Rights Act make their prospects all the more viable. Even apart from the
impact of those efforts, Harvard political scientist Steve Ansolabehere has estimated
Republicans’ chances to win the White House in 2016 as better than 50-50, since
Americans rarely award the presidency to the same party three elections in a row--,
though others contend that the GOP must break from the Tea Party in order to produce
that victory.24
The pertinent point here is not who is right or wrong in these political analyses of likely
future voting trends. It is that the upshot of these debates has been to strengthen
Republicans and conservatives in the belief that they do not need to modify their
positions to appeal to non-white voters in order to be politically successful in the years
ahead.
And they need not, fundamentally, because they believe they can further improve their
already strong position among white voters, who have voted against every Democratic
presidential candidate, albeit sometimes narrowly, since Lyndon Johnson in 1964.
There can be little doubt that their strategy depends on the belief that many white
Americans believe that contemporary America is in danger of a catastrophic fall from
the far better America of the past, one in which whites held hegemonic power.

24

Ibid.
Edsall, ibid.
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In so arguing, we should clarify that Trende did not argue Republicans should make
white racial appeals. He urged adoption of “economic populist” positions, even at the
risk of alienating the GOP’s big business supporters. And in characterizing vote
suppression efforts as well as “white voter” electoral strategies as part of the “last
stand” of America’s historical systems of white power, we do not mean to suggest that
proponents of these approaches embrace traditional white supremacist ideologies.
Many, probably most, are simply partisans seeking to gain power.

The fact remains, however, that they are seeking power by identifying their party with
the preferences of white voters.25 Most of those voters do not support any strong
measures to ameliorate America’s racial inequalities, the patterns of white’s relatively
advantaged status that can be found in most of the main arenas of American life. They
prefer to see the world they see as traditional and right preserved, with their traditional
relative advantages left intact. Although those advantages can be forfeited by modern
individual whites who act improvidently, they are available to whites more than blacks
largely as legacies of the economic, educational, political and social privileging of whites
that American white supremacists established in the not so distant past. When
Republicans seek to suppress the votes of non-whites who generally support policies
that would work against preserving those advantages, and instead court the votes of
whites who generally support policies that sustain privilege, then in effect if not in
conscious intent, they are seeking to preserve much of what survives of the older white
supremacist institutional ordering of America.26
This preservation effort fits with historical differences in political attitudes expressed in
contemporary America. In a study of attitudes amongst whites living in Southern
counties which had high shares of slave populations at the time of the Civil War, three
researchers find that voters there now evince more conservative attitudes than in other
counties. Using statistical controls and analysis, Acharya, Blackwell and Sen
(forthcoming) find that in these slave heavy legacy counties whites’ hostility to such
egalitarian measures as affirmative action is high and they find greater prevalence of
expressed racial resentment toward African Americans. Testing various explanations
for this pattern the authors demonstrate how tenacious historically formed racial
attitudes (privileged in instituions) are in these counties and how they are passed on
intergenerationally,
As some political columnists seem to recognize: John Harwood, “Behind the Roar of
Political Debates, Whispers of Race Persist,” New York Times 31 October 2013; and see
Paul Krugman “A War on the Poor,” New York Times 1 November 2013.
26 The notion that many whites find it difficult to support transformations in their
entrenched privileges is supported by a range of evidence beyond the straightforward
survey data showing that whites are less favorable to race conscious policies than nonwhites. In a study of attitudes amongst whites living in Southern counties that had high
shares of slave populations at the time of the Civil War, three researchers find that
voters there now evince more conservative attitudes than in other counties. Using
statistical controls and analysis, Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (forthcoming) find that in
these slave heavy legacy counties, whites’ hostility to such egalitarian measures as
affirmative action is high, and they find greater prevalence of expressed racial
resentment toward African Americans. Testing various explanations for this pattern, the
authors demonstrate how tenacious historically formed racial attitudes (privileged in
institutions) are in these counties and how they are passed on intergenerationally.,
25
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3. The Prospects for America’s Racial and Political Future.
As we have already noted, preservers of the old racial ordering of Americathey face
substantial obstacles in maintaining it in the 21st centurydoing so. Indeed, we do not
believe in the long run they can prevail. Not only is the Justice Department seeking to
use the VRA’s section 2 to “bail in” jurisdictions, including Texas, by showing that they
are seeking to abridge voting rights on account of race or color. In many states, a variety
of the civil rights advocacy and litigation groups active in the race conscious policy
alliance are challenging voter ID laws and other restrictive initiatives, with some signal
successes. A federal judge invoked the VRA’s Section 3 to reinstate oversight of voting
practices in Mobile Alabama; another invalidated Pennsylvania’s ID law for burdening
voting rights without any evidence that the law aided accurate voting; and in Wisconsin,
litigants are challenging the state’s voter ID law for racially discriminatory effects.27
And as noted, bi-partisan sponsors in Congress are seeking to take up the Court’s
invitation to amend the Voting Rights Act, including a new coverage formula. It is not
clear whether the U.S. Supreme Court will uphold the lower court rulings against vote
restriction initiatives, just as it is not clear whether any legislative action on the VRA
will occur. It is only clear that this crucial battleground for political power, and the
propriety of policies designed to aid non-white Americans against traditional forms of
white privilege, will continue to be a scene of intense contests.28 And importantly while
our stress has been upon African American voters, a recent study draws attention to the
barriers facing many American Indians to exercising their vote. Schroedel
(forthcoming) argues that blocs of Native American voters have been crucial to the
success of Democrats on numerous occasions in certain Western state districts and
senate races, and that these same constituencies have seen dramatic rises in voter
suppression measures and initiatives. In fact, Schroedel finds that Native American
For stories detailing these efforts, see
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/v/voter_registration_a
nd_requirements/index.html
28 While our stress has been upon African American voters, a recent study draws
attention to the barriers facing many American Indians to exercising their vote, often in
jurisdictions where they can make a difference. Schroedel (forthcoming) argues that
blocs of Native American voters have been crucial to the success of Democrats on
numerous occasions in certain Western state districts and senate races, and that these
same constituencies have experienced dramatic rises in voter suppression measures
and initiatives. Schroedel finds that Native American voters’ challenges remain of a
“first generation” type – basic obstructions to the act of voting – as much as “second
generation” barriers of the sort voter suppression laws symbolize. Examples of the
latter are new state laws proscribing tribal identification as acceptable forms of ID, the
absence of street addresses and utility bills on reservations which are often required as
sources of identification, and the issuing of provisional ballot papers which are accepted
as legal only on return of the voter with a requisite form of identification. As in the
application and justification of stringent voter ID laws elsewhere in the country the
claim that voter fraud needs tackling is not supported by evidence of widespread fraud
or voter impersonation (Schroedel forthcoming: 41-42).
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voters’ challenges remain of a first generation type – basic obstructions to the act of
voting – as much as second generation barriers of the sort voter suppression laws
symbolize. Examples of the latter are new state laws proscribing tribal identification as
acceptable forms of ID, the absence of street addresses and utility bills on reservations
which are often required as sources of identification, and the issuing of provisional
ballot papers which are accepted as legal only on return of the voter with a requisite
form of identification. As in the application and justification of stringent voter ID laws
elsewhere in the country the claim that voter fraud needs tackling is not supported by
evidence of widespread fraud or voter impersonation (Schroedel forthcoming: 41-42,
[WE can add more details here perhaps]Piven, Minnete and Groarke provide a
comprehensive typology of the current methods of voters’ suppression or what they call
‘keeping the voters down’ including misinformation campaigns, ‘caging’ and challenging
voters, and manipulation of registration records and lists (2009: 167-186).
We think it doubtful, however, that in the long run, efforts at vote suppression can
successfully prevent the growing numbers of non-white Americans from gaining voting
power more proportionate with their percentages of the national population. Unless
current voting patterns are sharply altered, these trends probably mean that the
Republicans will have great difficulty winning presidential elections by 2020. But
political scientists and GOP strategists are right to argue that they have real prospects of
success in 2016, and that they have the potential to control congressional and state
districts gerrymandered in their favourfavor for years after that.
These facts mean that, though it is likely that current conservative efforts to restrict
voting rights in ways that disproportionately affect non-whites, like the accompanying
efforts to restrict disproportionately non-white immigration, will ultimately prove to be
the “last stand” of efforts to preserve American institutions and practices ordered in
ways that have long most advantaged whites, the near term forecast is for stormy
weather indeed. Americans face battles over voting rights in their electoral campaigns,
in their legislatures, in their law enforcement agencies’ operations, and in their courts
that will be costly and time-consuming. In some instances they willmay well throw the
results of elections into doubt, delaying much of the work of the affected governments.
Only if most Republicans and conservatives decide these are fights they don’t want to
have or can’t win will these outcomes be avoided. Only then will America, in regard to
voting rights, cease to be a “house divided.” In the poignant words of Langston Hughes
wrote, that remains an America that “never has been yet--and yet must be.”29

17

Langston Hughes, “Let America Be America Again,”
http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/15609.
29
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